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posteriori link must be forged between animal and environment
and also between perception and action. By contrast, Gibson (1966;
1979) removed the need for such a posteriori links by making per-
ception and action adjoint, capable of mutual and reciprocal in-
teraction through an information field (Kadar & Shaw 2000; Shaw
et al. 1992; 1995). For Gibson, perception and action are functions
of organism-environment ecosystems where the fundamental
problem is the perceptual control of action. Consequently, his par-
adigmatic case was a moving observer guided by a lawful dynam-
ical relationship between perception and action. Just as moving
particles create forces and gradients, so do moving observers.
While electric currents generate magnetic fields, moving ob-
servers create velocity fields, that is, optic flow fields. Further-
more, this exchange of flows and forces promotes a circular causal-
ity in which egomotion generates a global flowfield and a flowfield
creates the impression of egomotion (Kadar & Shaw 2000). In
general, the perspective reflects several key trends in scientific ex-
planation: (1) a shift from anatomical specificity to functional
specificity; (2) distribution of representations; (3) the recognition
of the importance of local exigencies and context dependency; and
(4) decentralization of control.
Although codes are not equipped to explain the emergence of
order in non-biological systems, they are frequently invoked to de-
scribe the same in biological systems (Goodwin 1994; Kelso 1995;
Turvey & Fitzpatrick 1993). In standard accounts, perception and
action relate indirectly via mechanisms (e.g., programs or codes)
that seem to sit outside of natural law. Conversely, in field ac-
counts, perception and action relate directly and lawfully. Fur-
thermore, the burden of explaining the emergence of order by
field-dynamics seems far less taxing than the burden of appealing
to disjointed, discrete units such as codes (Weiss 1967).
Hence, parsimony dictates that the explanatory burden should
be removed from the code construct and placed squarely on the
shoulders of the field construct. Nothing of value would be lost
from doing so, while the gain would be to move psychology, biol-
ogy, and physics closer as natural sciences.
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Abstract: We share the authors’ general approach to the study of percep-
tion and action, but rather than singling out a particular level of “late per-
ceptual” and “early motor” processing for sensorimotor interactions, we
argue that these can arise at multiple levels during action preparation and
execution. Recent data on action-perception transfer are used to illustrate
this perspective.
Our commentary takes an unusual perspective. We are fully sym-
pathetic to the authors’ plea for an integrated study of perception
and action. We collaborated with them in their Munich laborato-
ries, and the notion of common coding (e.g., Prinz 1992) has in-
spired our experimentation. Perceptual and motor processes typ-
ically interact with each other, and this interaction serves many
disambiguating functions. We are not fully convinced, however, of
the merits of singling out a particular level of “late perceptual” and
“early motor” processing that should be privileged for code com-
monality and that in turn would leave “earlier” sensory and “later”
motor processing behind as incommensurate. Instead, we argue
for multi-level sensorimotor interactions that can arise at all per-
ceptual and motor stages.
Take the example of planning to squeeze an orange for break-
fast: we are happy to follow the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) in
characterizing this event as being represented in a cognitive code
that gets activated both during action planning and whilst per-
ceiving a friend performing this action, and we are reassured that
a common cortical area is involved in both situations (“mirror neu-
rons” in lateral premotor cortex; Rizzolatti et al. 1996). However,
it is equally clear that visuomotor processing does not stop at this
point. Once the action of squeezing an orange is selected amongst
a number of actions that were competing for execution, a new
plethora of interacting visuo-motor processes becomes involved
that guide the hand to the fruit, preshape its grip, place the fruit
on the work surface, and so on. A network of parieto-frontal cir-
cuits has been shown to be involved in integrating the sensory and
motor processes implicated in these activities (e.g., Burnod et al.
1999; Caminiti et al. 1998; Rizzolatti et al. 1998). Are we supposed
to describe action selection in TEC terms and to adopt an entirely
different perspective when studying visuo-motor processing of the
latter kind, that is, during action execution? The cortical networks
for action selection and execution are at least partially overlapping,
and the principle that sensory and motor signals relevant for an ac-
tion are processed simultaneously and interact at multiple levels
certainly holds for both. Thus, whilst we acknowledge Hommel
et al.’s battle against the dark ages of an isolated study of percep-
tion and action, we are concerned about their proposal of singling
out a specific level of coding for sensorimotor interaction to arise.
Instead, we take the latter to be a universal phenomenon.
For instance, whilst distal coding is clearly an important design
principle, it is not the only medium in which vision and action can
meet. Rather, egocentric frames of reference (or proximal coding)
are typically used in visually guided actions. More generally, visuo-
motor interactions in the moment-to-moment guidance of action
are, at present, documented in much greater detail (e.g., Jean-
nerod et al. 1995) than for the more complex processes of action
selection. We do not see the former, rich body of evidence ade-
quately reflected in TEC. Certainly, Hommel et al.’s proposal of
an ensemble of abstract features (such as object size or location),
allegedly used in perceptual identification and action planning,
could not easily be stretched towards execution, which requires
that objects be represented in partially different ways (semantic
vs. pragmatic representations; Goodale 1997; Jeannerod 1997).
Nevertheless, a theory of action planning would ideally address
the well-documented behavioral dissociations between vision-for-
perception and vision-for-action, in Milner and Goodale’s (1995)
terms, rather than leave us with a conceptual gap between plan-
ning and execution as TEC does.
We now review a recent study on action-perception transfer
(Hecht et al. 2001) that was motivated by the common coding ap-
proach. It clearly demonstrates TEC’s heuristic value, however, it
also suggests that cross-modal interactions are just as tenable for
explaining our findings as is a common coding account. Our ex-
ample will also demonstrate some of the difficulties in determin-
ing whether two separate but interacting representations are
formed, or whether one abstract representation is distilled from
sensory and motor inputs.
The starting point for our studies was the recognition that ef-
fects of action on perceptual processing had so far only been de-
scribed on the short time scale of concurrent interactions (e.g.,
Craighero et al. 1999) but not in the sense of lasting effects of mo-
tor learning on visual discrimination, which we coined “action-
perception transfer” (APT). The two basic tasks used were a mo-
tor production task and a visual judgment task, and we predicted
that motor practice without visual involvement should enhance vi-
sual discrimination due to an underlying common representa-
tional format of the two tasks. Experiment 1 in Hecht et al. (2001)
employed a rhythmic timing task where participants either pro-
duced a two-cycle arm movement with a certain time ratio (e.g.,
800 and 400 msec or 50%) that was verbally instructed in the be-
ginning of each trial (motor task), or they had to name the time ra-
tio of a two-cycle motion presented on a monitor (visual task).
Twenty-one different ratios between 50% and 200% were used.
Separate groups of subjects underwent pure motor practice or
pure visual practice and received verbal feedback about their
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movement or judgment. Subsequently, all groups were tested in
motor and visual performance without feedback. This design al-
lowed us to assess both transfer from perception to action (PAT)
and APT. Indeed, we found transfer of practice in both directions,
and APT in particular. That is, judgments in the visual test were
more accurate in the motor practice group compared to a control
group that received unrelated motor practice. Experiment 2
showed that APT did not depend on active movement but was just
as pronounced for participants undergoing passive practice. Pas-
sive participants merely received kinesthetic feedback about the
movement (their arms were fixed to a lever yoked to and driven
by the active participant).
These results can certainly be explained in terms of common
coding (or TEC), namely, in terms of an abstract code that repre-
sents features of the visual stimuli and arm movements, presum-
ably their relative timing. However, it also fits the bill of interact-
ing sensory and motor processes. Two reasons motivate us to
entertain the latter alternative. Firstly, the former explanation is
limited to timing tasks and would thus not cover the wider range
of tasks for which APT may be expected. Secondly, during the vi-
sual test, TEC would leave no role for kinesthetic or motor cod-
ing. In contrast, a multi-level interaction account would allow
matching of the novel visual stimuli to kinesthetic signals, which
our participants had learned to interpret during motor or kines-
thetic (“passive”) practice. Furthermore, sensorimotor interaction
allows motor encoding of the visual stimuli as mediator of visual-
kinesthetic matching (visuomotor-kinesthetic matching). After
evaluating the available evidence for each account, we tended to
favor the latter, which would predict a network of visual, motor,
and somatosensory areas simultaneously involved in coding the vi-
sual motion, rather than a single, amodal coding domain.
To conclude, the heuristic value of the common coding ap-
proach is undisputed, and our study exemplifies this. Rather than
constructing common versus interacting representations as theo-
retical alternatives, one might envisage event coding to rely on an
integrated network of sensory-dominant and motor-dominant
brain areas, with event codes as emergent properties of this net-
work. TEC’s gap between action planning and execution, however,
is a considerable price to pay for perception and action to meet,
and it leaves quite a bit to be desired towards a fully integrated ac-
count of cognition and action.
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Abstract: Hommel et al. propose that high-level perception and action
planning share a common representational domain, which facilitates the
control of intentional actions. On the surface, this point of view appears
quite different from an alternative account that suggests that “action” and
“perception” are functionally and neurologically dissociable processes. But
it is difficult to reconcile these apparently different perspectives, because
Hommel et al. do not clearly specify what they mean by “perception” and
“action planning.” With respect to the visual control of action, a distinction
must be made between conscious visual perception and unconscious vi-
suomotor processing. Hommel et al. must also distinguish between the
what and how aspects of action planning, that is, planning what to do ver-
sus planning how to do it.
Hommel et al. present a framework for characterizing the inter-
face between “perception” on the one hand and “action planning”
on the other. In their “Theory of Event Coding” (TEC), Hommel
et al. suggest that a common medium (the “event” code) is used
to represent both perceived features of the external environment
(i.e., stimuli) and features of possible actions (i.e., responses). Ac-
cording to Hommel et al., action planning is accomplished at the
same time that the target or goal stimulus is perceived, because
the event code does not discriminate between stimulus features
and action features. The TEC framework is both elegant and at-
tractive because it suggests that action planning does not involve
a discrete set of computational processes that must be described
separately from perceptual processes. But this elegance and at-
tractiveness is clearly superficial. The computational complexity
involved in getting from sensory input to useful motor output is
“hidden” in what the authors refer to as “early” perceptual pro-
cesses, and “late” motor processes – processing stages that lie be-
yond the scope of the theory.
We have no argument with the notion that sensory and motor
representations must be integrated for the planning and control
of action. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? It remains an open
question, however, as to whether or not the “event” coding scheme
proposed by the authors adequately captures the nature of the in-
terface between sensory processing and motor planning. In fact,
it is very difficult to judge the merits of TEC because the theory
as presented suffers from a problem that plagues “perception and
action” research: a failure to provide an adequate definition of the
critical terms “perception” and “action planning.” This is not a triv-
ial matter, because it has profound implications for the testability
of the theory.
Nowhere in the paper do Hommel et al. state whether “per-
ception” refers to conscious or unconscious processes. Indeed, at
one point they declare that TEC is not intended to address the re-
lationship between conscious perception and externally-directed
movements such as pointing and grasping. One gets the sense that
Hommel et al. do not consider this relationship to be of particu-
lar importance. This is rather puzzling in light of the substantial
literature (for review, see Milner & Goodale 1995) suggesting that
an important distinction can be drawn between the visual pro-
cesses that lead to conscious visual perception and those that sup-
port the visual control of action. Surely any theory that purports
to describe the interface between “perception” and “action plan-
ning” must address this issue, so that the theory can be considered
in the light of existing neurological and behavioural evidence.
Hommel et al. are equally opaque about the notion of “action
planning.” At times, they seem to be talking about action planning
as an issue of intention, as in deciding what to do; for example, de-
ciding whether or not to pick up a cup of coffee. In this sense, the
task is to select an appropriate course of action from a number of
possible alternatives, given a particular visual environment (e.g., a
table with cups of coffee and perhaps utensils) and a specific be-
havioural goal (e.g., to have a drink of coffee). At other times (e.g.,
in their discussion of attentional and intentional modulation of
event coding), they seem to use the term “action planning” to re-
fer to the problem of specifying how to accomplish an intended
action, for example, planning where to place the fingers when
grasping the cup of coffee. Indeed, their invocation of the visuo-
motor neurons in parietal cortex as examples of how “perception
and action planning may be interfaced in the brain” suggests that
they are focusing on the rather specific way in which visual inputs
are transformed into the co-ordinate frames of particular effec-
tors. But if TEC is to provide an account of how action planning
unfolds, Hommel et al. must clearly distinguish between the what
and how of planning.
The Milner and Goodale (1995) account of the two cortical vi-
sual systems is quite clear about the meaning of “perception” and
“action.” Perception refers to the conscious experience of visual
sensation, the phenomenal awareness of the form, colour, shape,
and position of visual objects in the world beyond our bodies. In
this context, perception does not refer to all sensory processing,
but to a specific type of processing that engenders conscious
awareness of the external world. In the Milner and Goodale
model, action refers specifically to the transformation of visual in-
formation into spatially calibrated motor outputs, which is of
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